The Courier

Signature of the Yaoundé I Convention, 20 July 1963: Ahmadou Ahidjo, President of Cameroon from 1960 until 1982.

© EC photo library

A place for ‘European countries and territories’  in the Treaty of Rome

It was when the Founding Fathers of the European Union, Germany, France, Italy and the three Benelux countries, were on the verge of completing the Treaty of Rome negotiations that France proposed that a place be reserved for an ‘Association Agreement’ with Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) – essentially those countries associated with France.

The outcome was that a text on the Association with Overseas Countries and Territories was added to Section 4 of the treaty, although there had been no negotiation and no agreement signed with the OCTs themselves. In fact, the agreement existed in name only, as the other articles in the Treaty of Rome referring to it were only signed by the six European signatory states.
The 1st European Development Fund (EDF) was the financial envelope allocated by the European Community to the Association, an instrument that was to become the backbone of Europe’s political aid.

The ingenuity of Yaoundé: contractual relationship and free trade areas

The independent movement that swept across Africa in the early 1960s prompted a rethink on the position of the Association Agreement with the OCTs in Africa which was still in force (covering a total of 19 countries – 18 former French colonies and Somalia).

The rethink brought forward a pragmatic solution. The ‘Association’ would continue on a provisional basis with amendments to be made in accordance with the status of newly independent African States. Each State could choose whether to remain a member. In the end, just one – Guinea-Conakry – made the decision to leave although it would later return in 1975 to sign the 1st Lomé Convention.

In 1963, negotiations between 18 African States and the six European countries resulted in the signing of the Yaoundé Convention between the European Communities and the ‘Associated African States and Madagascar’ for a five-year period (1964–1969).

At first it was all about trade. The Yaoundé Convention was essentially concerned with free trade areas and under its umbrella European products received preferential treatment on the markets of the associated African countries and vice versa. This free trade agreement was also backed up by a financial assistance package – the 2nd and 3rd EDFs for Yaoundé I and Yaoundé II. The 2nd Yaoundé Convention (1971–1976) was signed in 1969.

The birth of the ACP Group: a genuine political choice

As soon as Yaoundé I was signed, the newly independent English-speaking countries voiced a strong dislike to a convention they saw as ‘shaped’ to preserving links between France and its former territories. Their concerns were shared by EEC members such as Germany and the Netherlands who, since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, had been inclined towards a development policy with a broad spectrum.

To bring about these changes, a special bilateral agreement was signed with Nigeria in 1969 but was never ratified due to the civil war in Biafra. Another agreement, separate from the Yaoundé Convention, the Arusha (trade) Agreement, was signed in 1969 with three East African countries – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. This agreement, implemented on 1 January 1971, at the same time as the Yaoundé II Convention and for the same period of time, brought these three countries into the convention. Mauritius joined the Yaoundé II Convention at a later stage in 1972.

However, by the beginning of the 1970s Europe’s development policy was still at a crossroads, with questions being raised about the direction to take, highlighting cooperation with Africa and openings towards other regions. A memorandum of the European Commission put forward the options.

In January 1973, the United Kingdom (plus Ireland and Denmark) joined the European Community. This membership was to put everything in a new light. One of the protocols of the Act of Accession opened the door to an extension of European development policy to an array of Commonwealth countries. These were countries not just in Africa, but in the Caribbean and the Pacific too.

As of August 1973, 21 Commonwealth nations were invited to negotiate an association or trade agreement with the European Community that would possibly replace the Yaoundé Convention. All the independent nations of sub-Saharan Africa, except South Africa, were present at the negotiating table. They also included the non-Commonwealth countries of Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.

The negotiations that were opened between the European Community and this group of around 45 countries were to prove a unique experience. All these newly independent countries were used to meeting within large frameworks such as the UN or the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), where the only matters discussed were political. Now, however, they had to agree on questions very close to everyday realities on the benefits of an agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC). Not surprisingly, there were many differences of opinion: between French and English speakers, between large and small countries, between geographical regions. The sheer size of Nigeria, for example, seen even then as a future oil giant, was a concern for some.

The negotiations began at the end of July 1973 with a deadline set on the expiry of Yaoundé II at the end of January 1975. The Lomé Agreement was signed immediately after the deadline at the beginning of February 1975 by 9 EEC and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States.

More than developing relations with their European partners, it was relations between each other that initially mobilised the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Third-world thinking bound them together and forged their common interests, and they surprised the Europeans by announcing in the spring of 1974, through their spokesman Babacar Ba, with regard to the Lomé IV Convention: “You have before you not three groups expressing harmonised positions with one voice, but a single group of ACP countries which want to recognise their common destiny and the unshakeable desire to achieve positive results at these negotiations.”

This is how the ACP Group was born and its constitution was finalised with the ratification of the Georgetown Agreement of 6 June 1975, just a few months after the signing of Lomé 1 on 28 February 1975 by 44 ACP countries. These States had made a genuine political choice of their own, contrary to the frequently held belief that it was a decision taken under outside pressure.

Lomé: a new kind of cooperation

Lomé I (1975–1980) retained the strong points of Yaoundé, especially its character, including the contractual nature of aid and an additional number of provisions. This was obvious at the political level with the affirmation of the sovereignty of each State and respect for its choices. For example, during the Cold War period, Europe maintained privileged relations with both the Soviet Union and US-aligned countries.

At the commercial level, Lomé awarded the ACP countries preferential and non-reciprocal trade terms, protocols on selected products (e.g. sugar, bananas and beef) and also guaranteed the ACP countries higher prices than those on world markets (see article "Trade protocols and EPAs"). A system of compensation for trade deficits brought about by price fluctuations (Stabex) also provided a guarantee for the ACP producers. All this was seen as a commitment by Europe to the creation of a fairer world economic order.

At the sectoral level, the principal priority was agricultural infrastructure, while at the institutional level, Lomé moved forward by creating common institutions between donor countries and recipient countries: the EU-ACP Council of Ministers, the CDI (Centre for Development of Industry), later the CDE (Centre for the Development of Enterprises), and the CTA (Technical Centre for Agricultural Cooperation).

The Lomé II Convention (1980–1985) signed by 58 ACP countries in 1979 was very much a continuation of what had gone before. The sole major innovation was Sysmin, a mechanism for minerals that resembled Stabex and made it possible to help ACP countries maintain their production capacities or diversify their mining sector economies.

Then in 1985 with Lomé III (1985–1990), cooperation started to be viewed in a different light. A feeling of ‘aid fatigue’ began to surface and the optimism of the 1960s and 1970s on the future of former colonies had long since evaporated. Administrative chaos in some countries and the teething problems of fledgling democracies caused donors to lose their enthusiasm. At the same time, the citizens of the richer nations began to sense the end of the post-war boom and demanded rather less generosity from their governments towards the developing world.

The first warning shot that all was not well after the signing of Lomé III was the introduction of a debate on policies that rendered negotiations on the allocation of resources more strained than before. Even so, Lomé III recognised another emerging trend with a reference to ‘the importance of human dignity’, although the expression ‘human rights’ was still not included in the text. But a corner had been turned and this was the first blow dealt to the up-to-now sacrosanct neutrality of the agreement, where it was customary to turn a blind eye to the political aberrations taking place in ACP countries.

In praise of rigour

Lomé IV (1990–2000) was an even more important turning point. The fall of the Berlin Wall changed the geopolitical map overnight and Europe was looking at reunification. Also, the good times looked like they were over as two oil crises in a row shook the world’s economies and the populations of wealthy countries had a new concern: the erosion of their material security. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly clear that aid had not greatly improved the development of certain countries, especially in Africa. Worse than that, many of them had actually become poorer. On the eve of the Lomé IV negotiations these worries and concerns were all too clear in Europe.

The negotiators of the 12 European Member States and 68 ACP countries could not ignore these new realities. Negotiations were difficult but the final agreement included a chapter on human rights. From now on, human rights would be a fundamental clause in relations between the two sides, with the consequence of suspended cooperation for any country that violated them.

At the same time, control over the use of funds became ever stricter. That was the stick. The carrot was that the convention would be valid for double the period, a total of 10 years, with the aim of providing a better continuity of development programmes. There was also support for countries needing to make painful structural adjustments, as well as for the diversification of ACP economies, their regional cooperation projects and the promotion of their private sectors.

The mid-term review of the convention was a lot more extensive than planned, for example giving greater priority to the political dimension.
Cotonou (2000–2020):  transition leading to completion of the process
Cotonou gave a bigger role to civil society and the private sector (which were to be involved as a new set of cooperative players) and refined development strategies by awarding priority to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). It also prioritised regional integration of the ACP countries and brought in the idea of flexibility enabling additional resources to be granted to countries that use their funds most efficiently. Another pillar of the convention was an extension of political dialogue to include consolidation of peace and conflict resolution as well as conflict prevention.

The revision of the Cotonou Agreement in 2005 brought the opportunity for political dialogue between partners.

The EUFOR mission to support the Blue Helmets in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006 and support for the African Union (AU) mission in Darfur, both authorised by the ACP and using available European Development Funds, bears witness to the usefulness of this Cotonou innovation. Another symbol of political dialogue was the joint meeting between the European Commission and the Commission for African Union in October 2006. It was the first time in its history that the Commission had met outside the EU.

With the announcement of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) under Cotonou, it seemed that cooperation between ACP-EU countries had turned full circle. Free trade had been mooted under the Yaoundé Convention. Long debates ensued about whether or not to continue cooperation in the conventional way because the revised Cotonou Agreement brought about a fundamental change by stating that EPAs should be concluded by the end of 2007, the reason being that preferences granted by the EU to the ACP contravene the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. The aim is to facilitate the harmonious integration of ACP countries into the world economy, where competition is much fiercer than in the Lomé-Cotonou process. This leap into the unknown has left some ACP countries and European civil society actors puzzled.

It has been recognised that cooperation is a work constantly in progress. It has already proved itself and will continue to provide an element of security in a world full of uncertainty.

(1) The ‘Memorandum Deniau’ of 4 April 1973, defined  the characteristics of cooperation whilst retaining the established parts of Yaoundé, such as access to the European market and guaranteed aid, but also brought in novelties such as a system to protect developing country partners against sudden falls in commodity prices. In accepting this memorandum the Commission was for the first time given a mandate to negotiate a cooperation agreement.

(2) This was cited by Tom Glaser in the special edition of The Courier, March–April 1990.